

3-11-9

Anger of RU Throat

Anger of believing, each case of RU throat
or pump

(like Khosravi, or SIOP, or NATO)

"It must have had a very good
reason (even if it is wrong) for doing that -
I believe the story -

[McN - in 1961, "we focused on the
wrong case, and had intel" - for 1000 MM]
- they wouldn't, couldn't have done that
for the terrible reasons you say)

- so we can trust the judgment in future;
they've always been prudent, they've only
done what we would have approved
(or better) given the same, uncertain info..."

Bullshit!

~~John F. Kennedy~~

and we don't have to worry, because
chicks like that (Khosravi, or SU) don't
come along often, if ever; knowing on
that scale [wonder gap etc.]

and we have (even) better leaders now -
or, the point is, to shoot them...

The point is not to order, not to punish, not

"DON'T WAIT TILL
THE SMOKING GUN
IS A MUSHROOM
CLOUD"

and, this is a
new Nixon

to entertain with tales of forest horrors,
but to predict
protect ourselves

Change

take charge, responsibility, as
citizens (& Congress, & media)
(look, like WBs)

GET NUSS UNDER CONTROL —
OFF WEAPONS & SHIELDS, EVERYWHERE

~~Wants~~ like CO_2 !

(AIDS, Tobacco)

(see next article on extinctions)

OUR ARK (K-C-I?/G?)

Our ark has mixed team of anarchists
aboard, saboteurs — and a big one was
blackmailed

would kill any species that would it
onto Noah's Ark

"No more water, the fire next time!"

(My?!)

Some say the world will end
in fire, some say ice."

Babylonian

No, fire, the ice.

(Heisenberg's fruit machine to ^{PU} chaos: end of the world.

Paine + Kinder debate

3-11-9

Vs. Lauer

My point: no moral constraints have
prohibitively hampered USG elites + officials
since 1945

from

- & ex: non-existence of "moral taboo"
in minds of US officials (+ elites)

- though the defn. bound to US
public policy of "taboo" (and international):
a factor in non-imp. of threats
(along with first-hand lack of awareness it
would succeed: 1969, 1972 &.

(see "Hiroshima")

(to SU)

(Bombs might not have been

SU entry might not have been — for
same reason that SU entry + bombs (which
occurred) might not have been

(prob (no win with Bombs) =

prob (no win with Bombs + SU entry)

= prob (no win with SU entry)

That awareness is a spur to prolif.

and that fact ^(of no taboo) prevents USG officials from being willing
to have effective non-prolif program, or (NFC or)
radical disarm policy — since they expect the

want to threaten FU vs. R or C

or more likely, to prevent R or C
from extending a "nuclear umbrella" over
an ally:

i.e. make a credible FU threat vs.
a US ally

[We want to be able to say: We would
retaliate, and/or esp. vs. you — without
preclusive fear that you would respond or
esp. vs. us — since we might launch FS.

~~Our own ally~~

So — we can threaten FU vs. your ally; (froz
(you can't threaten to respond vs. us) from)

or extend our umbrella to Tavira but

but you can't threaten FU vs. our ally
even if it launches aggression

or, defends itself (having declared

Ukraine?

— recursion — Tavira, Chabys? — or having
waged aggression (Georgia — Ossetia?) affecting
with our own-our weapons

or "defends itself (having....) & our weapons
against a R or C ally

(say, if Israel strikes Iran with
nukes — R can't respond, can't give Iran
a nuclear umbrella.

"Umbrella"

vs. B

We can use nukes to respond to our attack of B vs. C
No one else can threaten our ally with nukes (?)

3-11-9

My b/p: Threats by SU/R or C to respond to
US EU has never been very credible
(see Taiwan starts 1958 - even it
was expected, but did not happen)

DBP - French phrase "inevitable..."

If we lived with that US "policy" forever.
(C, without attempting to achieve "parity."
EU backed down a few, fall 1980?

SU move to parity was stupid, dangerous,
unnecessary, and wasteful to point of bankruptcy.

Why should China reproach this mistake? It
has shown the capability to have the will
about the throughout: (Pres. getting a min. det.)

Are we going to maintain a EU/ES (vs. C)
force to defend Taiwan with EU threats?

(give Taiwan a few survivable ones?!)
(could have, Berlin; see McN 64)

Where else (~ Berlin, from, SUN, Taiwan: SK)

Unlike Taiwan right we want to use Figh II -
defend with more EU (like K in C-II) nowadays?

|| Vs. how burdens? (Would we suffer ^{from} Coordination
if we attacked then if forced did?

If C wants to threaten Taiwan with FU -
it needs a more summable min. det
(not, "being" with US)

What do you need, to extend "We umbrella"
over an ally faced with attack from
we-and imposed on its ally? \leftarrow we-and?
not we-and
with we umbrella
over it.

end-CW

^{side}
Eisen/Berlin no longer needs we umbrella for US.
Nor Iran! (since 1979)
Nor SVN! (since 1975)
Nor, really, SK. since?
(Nor Japan?) } before end of CW

Result of WP fears!

~~China~~ Uprising in East Eur could have
caused SU attack into West Eur (or Berlin)
until ~~1989~~ 1990! (not under Honecker, from 1985-86).

due to SU "machers" - WP Plans
Warsaw

~~Warsaw~~

+ limited-up,

+ repression.

(US repression plans: evidence, not deterrent!)

When hit Taiwan?!

8-11-9

How does McN justify building 1000 MM
not just after Sept. 61 (decision
is Oct-Nov) but in 1962
and deploying IRBMs in 1962?

only as FS threat:

Kanfer/hsr/Kagan plan!
Berlin (incl!) Milpatric
Sat Eve Post?

Altman (US umbrella over
Europe, vs. French

(I was involved!)

"deterrence"

UK

Israeli

South Africa

(?)
L & P right: K backed

down to clean threats

(I thought: he had to;
so I didn't oppose EU/FS threat!)

SEE SECRET AGENT,
OSS/POX

Ann Arbor 1962 prod

What if: US NEO in 1961-62?

C-II (Type II threat!

How?
MHH?

SU umbrella
and Cuba?
"No"

— vs. SU EU vs.

US invasion
(aggression)

— vs. SU non-use
"implied" as Finkel
or Berlin

see McN threats in spring '65
(Rusk/Chen 1964)

(Laws '61

3-13-09

(Do we rely on these threats for Empire?)

ME?

Maybe so! (Klaus)

How much would/went our SAC suffer
(compared to what? Our current Depression?)

if we abandoned Nuclear Empire?

substantially

or, if we abandoned Empire altogether?

(like...?)

Germany? Japan? China?

France? Australia? NZ?

LA?

D.M.

If US plans for GW are carried out,
any of the larger "options" will constitute
the greatest mass killing of innocents in
human experience ... will inflict...

almost surely, "option" ^{still} will attack a multiple

cities → poss. more winter (certainly, cap. exists

Candidates for Evil persons:

for resurrecting
past plans...)

Tom's grandfather, Dr. Richter

HAK? (people say yes: to exaggerate his role)

N (' don't say - the under-rate " "

Nathan, et al

GWB?

CHENEY

(Woburn? Nash Field? No...)

3-13-69

§100-62-Type "option"?

Is "football" or not?

Who in Congress knows?

McC. thinks?

Who in Cabinet? (NSC?)

McC. committed? Plan, training, target "folders"?

~~Is~~ Adm. to come out?

U-I targets?

What should we learn from fact that
the "option" even existed (as exp., + plan)

and was not public out

(e.g. Lee, JFK, LSJ...)

not known to (?) or discovered

with Congress

(People more evil than? Dumb?)

How did it come about?

[see COC!]

Should it exist?

(If it does)
(Does it?)

What if other news?

Do we (+ Gen, + ...) have an
interest, or are right, to know nature of
Russian plans? or is that within
bounds of inviolable sovereignty?

(like secret albums; Schlufer
Plan)

3-13-09

What are VCS/CRA estimates of effects
(a) labor, environment, military/pol.

of an Israeli new attack on Iran?

3-15-09

in CW

Realistic elites, liberals

Realism is ~~John~~ + Henry were right
is being the domestic political efforts of
the on gov leaders arguing control of
nuclear weapons

(or, affair with cap.)

proving the "one umbrella" (less
credible, esp. on T-1, though much bigger in
scale - was that really necessary? Not for
France. Only for US, "umbrella," threats was
indisputably credible)

controlled by US

~~less~~

if direct threat the possible militancy
+ behavior of the on leaders (shifting to right)
and with arms, not not dependent on and
entangled with others (NATO) + esp. US.

and to interpret the comparable fears of
~~but~~ others. (after WWII - as for France, WWI
+ Franco-Prussian)

But if was wrong to trust US leaders
any more than the own (though for a while -
Clinton?
to VN? (not Carter, Reagan, GWB (GWB, maybe!))

AND PREP. AND THREATS

OF SUPER-HOLOCAUST

EFFECTS OF NUCS + SUPREMACY ON OURS...

US aggression in Iraq = German/Japanese aggression

(The (Xen) Holocaust was not "threatened"
(except March 1939)

was was SB, in Turner form
(denial at the time)

(?)

or most mass killings of Serbians

(Bosnia - Dabail would work? is answer: DALLAIRE = ME (though this plan
all over Facts Accomplish was not, "contingency
(was prepared long in advance, see see) plan")

CASSANDRA PROBLEM

My problem,
of credibility

So we are not accustomed to looking
at, recognizing, either threats or contingency plans
for mass killing of civilians...

(I bet suppression of Albanians in Kosovo
was long planned, as a contingency plan:

(have at Valentino: who could have
warned, how long in advance, on what
evidence?)

In Katrina - lack of contingency planning
to avert or alleviate a very likely catastrophe:
9-11? (Clarke)

SEE IRAB, not "contingency" planning!

IRAB?

3-15-09

Threats of Evil

the
Revelation

(My problem:

Contingency plans to do Violence
are not necessarily Evil

nor are Good, ones

nor are, plans to do Evil or Wrong
orders.
if carried out

likewise, threats of Violence

(are though, as Gendreau's path

point out, these can + usually do

have harmful consequences

on themselves (as persons)

on recipients

and on others

are aware from increasing the risk
that they will be carried out in some situation,
or small; in addition to (perhaps, overwhelming)
any benefits that may result.

X

"US FS + FO

PREPS + Contingency
Plans"

CONTINGENCY

PLANS TO DO EVIL

IN SUPPORT OF

THREATS

For most people (is there, not Catholics, though
is practice) threats are to do Evil — and

are purposeful commitments to carry them out,

with some cues (cross-compliance, + Pres orders, +

"compelling necessity"), to make threats effective (and
perhaps, learn prob. of some Evil of others: ^{threat} ~~learn~~

or are threats never] are not necessarily Evil

If my be not only intended to have many
good effects, avoid a evil

(Further, it is judged, the the
threat is not accepted, though not me.
greater than the action & consequent threatened:

"10 eyes for an eye"

"disprop. threat: ' + 10%' (HAK)

but to my be, is best judgment,

- good (to the good) beneficial

- en, "overcoming, essential, morally
obligatory"

(like actual "humanitarian intervention,"

(en critical UN SC sanction)

or torture (to prevent terrorism).

The latter claim, by authority (esp. as a
pre-avowed just. of a count policy
over force out, as carried out as a
fairly accepted, esp. a failure (then requiring
justification')

is commonly accepted unconditionally of
public; questioning it is unpatriotic, disloyal
(as, if war is ongoing, encouraging to adversaries,
dangerous to our troops)

There is a 64-year-old "transition" in
the US (+ about 54-year-old in NATO)

that creates + threatens a system for
estimating the SO is not only not-Evil,
or under-weakness,
but a core obligation of ^{Western} morality,
protection of Western civ

(see also Hays (of NATO command))

us. NEU proposal of Hays of 1983: yes?

Devised Machine

But it constituted a D.M. ^{esp. for Europe!} has been
abandoned, is still not realized: I oppose
AS OFFICIALLY KNOWN (not just FUH in Sci
America?)

but would that, of itself, lead to
rejection of ~~the~~ most public, as now
the of drains after 1983?

IS A DM ~~BAD~~ BAD, ^{or} EVIL,

even if risking esc. from not-unlikely FU?

* (I agree, it is ^{DM} unlikely to be triggered —
UNLESS of ³ factor alone! — EXCEPT of
(b) factor of esc. risk or preemption triggered
by FU, esp. by US or Russia (i.e. and
conflict involving either + potentially over both).

* BUT THAT ^{AND ATTENDANT HARM/EVIL} IS MUCH LESS UNLIKELY THAN PEOPLE REALIZE.
(see JCS in USCP 1961; Berlin; Cuba; Bay of Pigs '58; Iran '80)

FU AS

DETONATOR

(not certain)

RAND/USAF image of SU in 1958-61:

RW-Pearl Harbor

(But that was reckless, stupid,
fatal!)

My Art of Conversion lectures

(+ ambiguity)

12:10 PM 3-26-09 Thurs. morning

The reason USG, ^{not NATO} won't proclaim
NFO is that. ~~IS~~ NATO "must"
perceive a EU threat against
conventional attack from Russia!

Georgia! Ukraine! Steins Azerbaijan!

What can we begin here to fear
conventional attack

But "new EU" does — and if
NATO extends to border of Russia,
EU IS BACK!

(NATO could and should either

1) remove EU threat (yes)

or 2) Reject new border states in NATO

(or 3) allow Russia into NATO?

= US Type ~~to~~ unilateral over EAST NATO

Meanwhile, US must remove ~~the~~ EU

But Israel does "and" EU;

India?

+ Pakistan

+ Iran

+ NK

China — no, unless Taiwan!

Russia — no!

UK — NO FRANCE — NO

R (Putin) could ensure nothing that
(like Gorbachev, Gennady)

Prophetic need for EU was always spurious
for Europe

(for Berlin, no)
northern Russia, no

"SU = Hitler" ^{applied for aggression} :: reckless military conquest

3-26-09

Explanations

US "inbulla"

EPT may under-rate the ^{retained} "sense" that the build-ups have/wake for US leaders - repeated, external purposes that are served as well as the (economic) intention of "instruments" that shaped the domestically ^{groups} (which NC, like EPT? also explores).

"Structuralists"? For ^{some} historians, ^{premise} premise may be that (as Vansittart put it, in Sleight of Tongue - Fine) everything happens/happened "as it had to," as it was meant to...

as it turns, its general shape and (because) everything that happened was over-determined - if one or several alleged "causes" had been changed or been different, it still would have come out about the same

A dynamic process that is/was very stable; disturbances don't affect course of events very much or very long

(?)
- under-rates personality, shifts in leadership, effects of timing, interpretations, contexts:
CONTINGENCY

4-2-9

Threats & Evil

Is it Evil to

- 1) Intend to do Evil, in certain cases
in order to deter/prevent an Evil

Warrior

or less

or just, or good?

Bluff

- 2) to Pretend to intend, etc.

(Vonnegut: you are what you pretend
to be...)

- 3) ... to carry out a threat of Evil,
entirely into his purpose (1)

(~~yes~~) Is it Evil to make a Threat of Evil
that is not a conscious, carefully-controlled Bluff,
Pretence (Lie?)

"I intend to..."

"I will... surely..."

"I cannot do otherwise..."

"I cannot offer not to..."

(K at Vienna, on JFK's claim that US "force/
pressure" is involved in Ross (Berlin?))

-You Western have subtle ways of
making threats..."

4-2-9

Threatening deals with (?) "the rational mind" (left brain? distinction

of an opponent: calculating

comparing options, alternatives

perceiving "choice"

weighing evidence, testimony

operations

see Paul Slowie

on "Moving to Statistics":

Knorr, Mrs. Kelly

or (also?) the instinctive

impulsive

"good/bad"

Threat transfers control of events to another, ^{ensuing} an adversary - "It's up to them... war of nerves, etc."

Relies either on the "rational choice" or the intimidated, "terror-stricken" emotional reaction

(But if opponent is not "moved" to feel/react to threat of "abstract destruction"

[Japanese in Tokyo did not "see"

Nuclear destruction - heard reports

(see "demonstration"?! Was Oppie wrong?)

EXPREMIST/RADICAL (the 66 3-3-9 on OLC memos
BUT this applies to (SB vol) are policies

of last 66 years (1943-).

90 years ago

re, AAF / Dumbel / Mitebel 1919/23/...

FU thinks will all be "discovered"

after one is carried out!

(like near-core-militaries, after
3-mile Island)

inc. perhaps my work, + Hessa, Marking
(without attribution!)

(see Melt-down
Catastrophe

4-6-9

11

As if (Krugger puts it: they assume)

System is fundamentally sound

Monetary assets/motives are fundamentally valuable

[US has been making EU GAMBLES/BETS
("betting the farm
the household
on one, the Earth")

for ~60 years (1949

1948 - Berlin Crisis B-29's to

UK

google

"Table stakes"

Bluffing? (No)

as if having prices would never go down

as if: - our threats would never be called

- no paper alone would ever (but: Dark Horse (Hoop?))

go more than 10 minutes

- no UA

- no proof to "indeterminable" & group.

How much was
this considered? before 1991?

(Pam Anne has blackmail

false claims?)

US influence / empire has been based (partly
on real assets, reserves, productive cap., reserves...)

~~partly~~ ^{partly} on Destructive Capability

and our supposed Will to use it
(even when risky or disastrous to us:
vs. SU or its clients

critical role of our
Honor, credibility (recklessness
ruthlessness

stupidity / over-confidence

HUBRIS — wpt risks to

numbers, O-L

(not ^{only} that we can "make good on
our promises, contracts, based on our
reserves of assets, prod. cap., line of credit...)

but that we can/will make good on our
threat ^{promise} to bomb, invade, kill

(Rums: "the word ("honor") of the US is the
back-bone of world order."

4-6-9

13

Thus, fear of "dominos" (see Stage III to David North)
is like "fear of a run on the bank."

Either to warn of lack of credibility
of promise, or threat (distinguish)
or to fail to carry out

or failure to do so successfully,

Computably

"to win"

is likely to make warning or failure a
self-confirming prophecy

(AS IN CURRENT CRISIS)

(Dominoes) and/or feedback, self-replicating, reproducing,
escalating, widening

Empire as Protection Racket

TR ref:

Mule/Gang Warfare

US news = Chicago Gang-guns

(see movie, Dillinger)

CMG's as offensive weapons

mobile; automatic ^{gun}

St. gun, Bazooka gun, Uzi, Swedish K

AK-47, M-16, assault rifles

(recent massacres)

(see movies with chases - through city
streets, highways, stairs - that men kill
passers-by, by forced gangs

like this, use of automatic weapons
or pistols in crowds, without collat. damage

Cops' bosses:

("You destroyed X cars, stores...")

men, people!

Unimportant cop perks...

(Dante Yang in 007 men kills innocent)

"V"

many "snafus"

(but see: "Munich")

like "After. Now"

& this is For Poerig

Robert W. Tucker: doubts the ~~philosophical~~ proposition that
certain evil acts "will compel the actor and
thereby defeat his ends (as even Aristotle is thought).

certain

(DAD - Threats of Evil do, too)
corrupt